

## CHAPTER SIX

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### *The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy*

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#### Introduction

This chapter will focus on the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and public diplomacy (PD). The rationale for this particular focus lies in the confluence of the institutional changes within the European Union (EU) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, which has placed the EEAS as a core facilitator at the heart of the EU's external relations. The latent potential in the EEAS to instill more coherence, effectiveness, and visibility in the external actions of the EU may well have positive side-effects for PD.

The chapter acknowledges though that there are also profound challenges to the external aspects of EU PD. Many of the challenges are specific to the EU and a good number arise from uncertainties arising from the Lisbon Treaty itself, while others are more generic in nature and apply with equal force to PD elsewhere in the EU institutions, or even to the national context. In order to understand the potential impact of the EEAS on EU PD it is therefore necessary to briefly review the pre-Lisbon practices. The later sections will consider the EEAS itself and, in particular, the EU's delegations that are an integral part of the EEAS.

The contribution is divided into six sections. The first considers the meaning of PD with particular reference to the European level. The inter-mestic (one that blends the international and domestic aspects of a policy or issue) nature of the EU's PD is noted as a distinguishing feature.<sup>1</sup> The second section presents a brief overview of the pre-Lisbon practice of PD, its challenges, and shortcomings. The influence of the "pillarisation" of the EU on PD in particular will be considered. The third section will consider the post-Lisbon context and the core role of the EEAS with regard to PD. The following section will focus on the EU delegations that are at the

coalface in terms of the Union's external PD. The fifth section will briefly touch upon digital diplomacy, which is a growing aspect of PD, including in the EU context. The final section will consider the principal challenges facing the EU and, more specifically, the EEAS in its external PD.

### **Public Diplomacy and the European Context**

A succinct version of the Commission's understanding of PD was provided as part of a booklet produced on the occasion of the EU's fiftieth anniversary celebrations:<sup>2</sup>

Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU's goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media.

This rather broad definition captures the essence of the EU's internal and external PD. In essence, it is about self-image, or the image that a given actor intends to project to a third party. The EU's PD is complicated by the imprecise nature of the EU's overall *actorness* or, put more simply, the type of actor the EU wishes to become on the international stage.<sup>3</sup> This is in part due to the fact that the EU is an ongoing project, lacking *finalité* but may also lie in a broader post-Cold War existential crisis about who and what the EU is on the global stage.

To pick up on a theme from the first chapter, PD can be closely equated with the notions of identity, norms, and narratives. The three notions are actually interconnected in the sense that the identity of the EU is very much driven by the promotion of norms, or its core values and principles, and this is part of the metanarrative of the postmodern Union. But, as it stands, this is something of an idealized image of the EU's PD since, as will be explored below, all three notions are subject to contestation and even discordant narratives emanating from other EU institutions or the member states.

One of the complicating factors when considering the EU's PD is that, historically, it has been directed primarily inward. PD is more normally associated with its international aspect, "directed towards foreign publics and conducted abroad."<sup>4</sup> In the case of the EU the internal aspects of PD are very much part of the construction of the identity and narratives that are employed externally. As a result, the distinctions between the internal and external aspects of PD have become increasingly difficult to maintain, especially in a saturated media environment where domestic and foreign audiences have equal access to official information.

The complex linkage between the internal and external dimensions of EU PD is perhaps best thought of as a self-reaffirming process, whereby the messages communicated internally are also directed externally as part of the Union's ongoing internal identity construction. This melding of

the internal and external aspects of policies, or the intermestic dimension, applies with particular force to the EU's PD. The international projection of the EU relies heavily upon the promotion of the "domestic" Union as exemplar—"you too could be like us." The legitimacy of the internal identity construction, the acceptance of norms, and the consensus around narrative will therefore do much to determine the legitimacy of external PD to both EU citizens (who wish to see reflections of themselves) and to third parties (who wish to see the virtues of the European example reflected towards themselves).

The draft Communication Strategy for the EU's External Policy 2006–9, presented to the Commission by the then Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, makes the symbiotic nature of the internal and external aspects of EU PD clear:

The task before us is therefore to... better inform a broader audience in third countries about the Union's policies, but also about its underpinning values and objectives as global actor [sic.]. This includes communication about the external consequences and projections of the EU's internal developments and policies.

In addition, there is a need to maintain a more sustained, open dialogue with the public *within the EU on the Union's external policy*. A stronger focus on this area would reflect the increasing importance of the external dimension of the Union's activities.<sup>5</sup>

According to this logic, if the EU promotes itself as a paragon of peaceful coexistence, or an area of "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights," it must be seen to be so internally or else the external PD will ring hollow.<sup>6</sup> This notion is reinforced by the Treaty on European Union, which, if anything, is even more explicit about the external objectives and principles than the internal aspects.<sup>7</sup> The key external messages have either concentrated on exporting the EU's "model," which includes its normatively laden values and principles or, on more specific matters, it often takes the form of *infopolitik*.<sup>8</sup>

At a more practical level, the intermestic nature of the EU's PD is evident when it is borne in mind that the EU has no less than 164 national missions accredited to the EU and 36 international organizations and other representations—making it one of the largest diplomatic communities globally.<sup>9</sup> The first stop in terms of the external dimensions of the EU's PD is therefore Brussels itself where embassies, consulates, and missions, as well as foreign NGOs, are privy to internal debates and developments within the EU. The EEAS has made considerable efforts to engage with the international press located in Brussels, much of which is oriented towards the member-states themselves. A striking example would be a debate—to which press were invited—involving a critical assessment of French military operations in Mali and the weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in which senior European Parliamentarian and EEAS officials participated.<sup>10</sup>

The EU's efforts to conduct its PD have been frustrated on occasion by the PD of the member-states. Margot Wallström, at the time vice-president of the European Commission responsible for institutional relations and communication strategy, made the point rather directly:

As you well know, national governments like to claim credit for EU decisions that prove popular and to blame “Brussels” for the unpopular ones. All too often they fail to explain to their citizens why and how these decisions were taken. The result is that too many people are ill-informed about European issues and many have a negative image of the EU. That can lead to big political problems.<sup>11</sup>

The problem is equally frustrating when it comes to the external dimensions of PD that, from a national perspective, is often viewed as an integral part of *national* diplomacy (even if at arm's length on occasion) aimed at “country projection and brand promotion” with relatively little focus on engaging civil society.<sup>12</sup> The inclusion of highly sensitive cultural aspects, such as those designed to foster the greater use of particular languages internationally (in the case of France this is a specific *foreign policy* aim which is echoed by Germany and Spain), can also shape individual national perspectives on the role and space for EU-level PD.

By way of contrast, the EU as well as other bodies like the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are more likely to focus more on transversal policy issues, such as climate change, migration, or human rights, which tends to demand a more diversified approach to PD in terms of the referents and policy scope. This is certainly the case with the EU where the intermestic nature of its PD implies the presence of many potential referents, across many themes and geographical areas, circumscribed by the parameters of PD as practiced by the EU's institutions and the member-states themselves.

### **EU Public Diplomacy Pre-Lisbon**

Much has already been written on the pre-Lisbon aspects of EU PD, its actors, and their various roles.<sup>13</sup> This section will therefore only offer a brief review and will not attempt to be exhaustive. The key purpose of this section is to highlight a number of unresolved issues surrounding EU PD and to give the reader a clearer idea of the challenges ahead for the EEAS.

The first and most obvious characteristic of pre-Lisbon PD is that it was highly fragmented. The “pillarization” of the EU into distinct policy areas, of which foreign and security policy was one, meant that PD was conducted by the Council Secretariat and the Commission with variable degrees of connectivity. The Council Secretariat was represented primarily in this realm by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP from 1999 until 2009. He was supported by his spokesmen, a number of Special

Representatives appointed by the Council and a Directorate-General for Communication, Information Policy and Protocol.

On the Commission side PD relied heavily on providing “information” to both EU citizens as well as to a wider global public. The principal (passive) vehicle was the network of EU Information Centres (EU-i) first established in the 1960s. The EU-i centers originally started off under the aegis of the European Commission’s DG Communications but responsibility for the external relations aspects were transferred to DG External Relations (Relex), which covered the Relex “family.” The information centers now number over 500 worldwide, with multiple centers in the larger EU strategic partners. The centers have evolved from primarily documentation centers to more demand-driven computer-based services. This approach serves as a good example of the tendency to equate the notion of PD with *infopolitik*, which, bearing in mind the responsibility of DG Relex for providing a sizeable portion of the original staff for the EEAS, is a significant legacy problem.<sup>14</sup>

PD within the Relex *famille* was coordinated through the Relex Information Committee (RIC). The monthly meetings of the committee assembled the relevant personnel from other parts of the extended *famille*, which included DG Development, Trade, AIDCO (Europe Aid), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), ELARG (Enlargement), PRESS, ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), as well as Relex itself. The information budgets within the seven DG’s represented in RIC represented around 70 officials and a budget of €30–40 million per annum.<sup>15</sup> The committee had a second equally important function, which was to ensure that the communications of the delegations to third parties reflected the views of the Commission as a whole and not only those of DG’s Relex and Dev. At a more general level, the Inter-Institutional Group for Information (IGI) meets frequently at vice-president level to coordinate a variety of information issues.

In spite of the positive role of the RIC, the Commission’s overall PD effort was disjointed. This gave rise to three principal challenges. First, as observed, there was a lack of horizontal devices to link PD across the EU institutions, including the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and, increasingly, the European Parliament as well.

The second problem, which stemmed from the pillarization of EU external relations, was the heavy emphasis upon community resources for PD. This led to the predictable situation where the foreign and security policy aspects (CFSP) had little in the way of resources and thus were stymied in their ability to present these critical aspects. The Commission’s delegations were at the forefront of the Commission’s PD efforts but since they did not represent the CFSP or ESDP aspects, this led to the development of a “consumer oriented” diplomacy, catering to the technical assistance and information for the local communities.<sup>16</sup>

The third weakness was the lack of a big picture or overarching strategic context within which to locate the EU’s external PD. As a consequence there is little to indicate priorities or hierarchy between the 134 country strategies, numerous thematic (counter-terrorism, nonproliferation or

sustainable development) and even continental strategies (Asia, Arctic, or Africa) often led to confusion regarding the principal objectives of the Union's PD. One discernible theme for the EU's pre-Lisbon PD is often seen as stemming from the Union's normative nature, stressing the EU's values and principles. This has, however, frequently chimed awkwardly with the predominant trade or energy interests of the member states, as in the case of much of Asia or Russia. The default therefore tended to be the provision of "basic information" to media and policymakers.<sup>17</sup> This led observers like Dov Lynch to conclude that the EU "does not conduct PD. Its overall philosophy is that of information dissemination. This means that Union activities are information-led and passive. The focus falls heavily on 'what we say' rather than 'what they hear'."<sup>18</sup>

It is also worth noting that much of the pre-Lisbon PD was based around the Commission's 2006–2009 Communication Strategy, mentioned above. This has not been updated with any comprehensive Communication Strategy linking the different actors involved in the external aspects of PD. The lack of an overarching strategic perspective that informs and shapes the EU's external actions has reinforced the tendency to stress information dissemination *qua* PD.

### **EU Public Diplomacy and the EEAS**

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty PD is no longer conducted exclusively by the Council Secretariat and the Commission, but also by the EEAS. The advent of the EEAS held the promise of linking together strategic communication, PD, and stakeholder engagements in ways that had hitherto eluded the EU with the intention of creating an overall communication culture extending across the EU institutions involved in external actions (which is nearly all). Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also a vice-president of the Commission, under the Lisbon Treaty contributed to these expectations in her "Step Change" document when she spoke about the need for "a professional communications structure in order to engage all stakeholders and public opinion. This is important within the EU as well as to the outside world." The EEAS must also, "above all," have a "strong and substantive media operation, in order to deal effectively with a global, 24 hour news culture that requires information and comment." She also noted the need to manage "dialogue with civil society, NGOs, and other nonstate actors, and make use of new electronic and social media, etc, in attracting interest, shaping debate and building understanding on foreign policy issues." Finally, she noted the need for better integration of the EU delegations "in the promotion of EU interests, requiring better briefing and debriefing of Delegations."<sup>19</sup>

Other ideas regarding the EEAS and PD soon landed on the table. A Greek so-called nonpaper (a discussion document not representing an official position), presented to the Political and Security Committee,

argued that there is a need to “ensure that the EU’s means and resources in the field of PD are commensurate with the EU’s new ambitions for a more coherent and active foreign and security policy.”<sup>20</sup> The Greek non-paper had many positive attributes, but it also dodged some important questions. The first issue is *what* should be communicated in terms of the central themes of EU PD or, as it was put by Herman van Rompuy, the first president of the European Council under the Lisbon Treaty, “how to deal, as Europe, with the rest of the world.”<sup>21</sup>

The essence of this question was posed by the Lisbon Treaty (amending the founding treaties of the European Union), which aimed to make a more coherent, effective and visible EU. These were also questions that EU leaders, heads of state and government, think tanks, and others were supposed to be debating. Whatever debates started were soon extinguished by the all-encompassing debates surrounding economic governance and the global financial crisis. In an unfortunate confluence, the more existential crisis about the EU’s role in the world that existed prior to the Lisbon Treaty, was overtaken by a real-world crises (notably the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone), with as yet unclear consequences for the EU’s PD.

It was against this almost perfect storm of an international system in flux since the end of the Cold War, the EU suffering from internal doubts due initially to the prolonged process of passing the Lisbon Treaty and then the “eurozone” crisis, that the EEAS was born. The EEAS was only part of a more substantial institutional upheaval in the external relations of the EU that also included the introduction of the role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice-president of the Commission (henceforth HR/VP). The treaty also saw the European Council become an institution in its own right, with a full time president. The virtual disappearance of the rotating presidency system, held by member states for six months, was a further significant change. The former role of the rotating presidency of the Council was now assumed by the aforementioned president of the European Council, the High Representative and a permanent chair of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).<sup>22</sup>

In PD terms the Lisbon Treaty changes offered the potential for a more consistent message, especially in the absence of the rotating presidency which tended to introduce new priorities into external relations following the proclivities of the particular member state for the duration of their tenure at the helm. On the other hand, the list of actors at the top levels remained extensive and would require considerable coordination between those aspects of PD falling under CFSP (involving the president of the European Council, the High Representative, the EEAS, and the member state) and those falling under the Commission (involving the president of the Commission and nearly all directorates-general that in some way, shape, or form have an external mandate). The challenge facing the potential actors at various levels *vis-à-vis* PD was therefore one of coordination if key themes and messages were to be disseminated effectively regarding the EU’s external action. Going back to the discussion above, it

is also important to bear in mind that communicating the EU's external relations is at least as important within the EU as it is to third parties.

The role of the HR/VP, with her multihatted role spanning the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the EU aspects of external action, makes her PD role especially visible. During 2011, the first year of the Service's existence, the High Representative and the EEAS issued 593 statements and declarations (including 328 statements by the High Representative, 128 spokesperson's statements, 51 local EU statements and 86 declarations of the High Representative on behalf of the member states. The figures for 2012 were broadly similar.<sup>23</sup> The importance of her role in this context was foreseen in the lead-up to the creation of the EEAS.

The High Representative's March 25, 2010 draft Council decision establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS, stated that it would be responsible for "communication and PD" and that there should be a department for "information and PD"; an attached organigram, showing "Basic Structures" of the EEAS dutifully represented a box for communication and PD.<sup>24</sup> In the initial concept of the EEAS the newly appointed HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, recommended that within its central administration there should be "departments for inter-institutional relations, information and PD, internal audit and inspections, and personal data protection."<sup>25</sup> An annex to this document lists the departments and functions to be transferred to the EEAS from the Commission and Council Secretariat. These include "all information and PD sections and staff" from DG Relex's External Service (i.e., the delegations and Relex K staff).<sup>26</sup>

The draft was rapidly rejected by the European Parliament, necessitating a major redraft, which was then presented by the High Representative on July 26, 2010. The new draft also foresaw a department for "information and public diplomacy" and specified that all information and PD sections and staff in the (Commission's) External Service should be transferred to the Service.<sup>27</sup> Following the adoption of the decision by the Council and the approval of the necessary amendments to the financial and staff regulations by the European Parliament, the EEAS became a working reality on January 1, 2011. The EEAS's organigram includes a division called "Foreign Policy Instruments" (FPI).<sup>28</sup> The FPI includes responsibility for "Public diplomacy and election observation," which includes the budgetary aspects. Part of FPI's mandate is to implement tenders on "media relations and media promotion through notably audiovisual, web products and printed products, and well as through other communication and information initiatives related EU actions and policies in the field of external relations."<sup>29</sup>

The FPI was created by the Commission in October 2010 and falls under the political responsibility of the HR/VP (in her *latter* guise) but, "the Commission shall be responsible for their financial implementation under the authority of the High Representative in her capacity as vice-president of the Commission."<sup>30</sup> This is a slight oddity of the Service since PD in the EEAS is conducted through Strategic Communications

and the delegations, but the FPI manages the budgetary aspects of the EU delegations PD that fall under the Commission's budget. In spite of the fact that the FPI works very closely with the EEAS and other parts of the Commission, it seems increasingly anomalous for the FPI to retain the budgetary authority over a significant aspect of the Service's PD. The EEAS budget covers administrative credits and, within the existing budgetary structures, the only possible way of shifting the PD budget towards the Service itself would be to redesignate this part of the Commission's budget as administrative credits. To add to an already complicated situation, some aspects of PD fall directly under the HR/VP such as the communication and PD aspects of election observation missions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

The lack of an obvious link between the FPI, Strategic Communication and Strategic Planning, as well as the relevant desks in the crisis management bodies, leaves the HR/VP as the critical link. The attendant complications include potentially slow response time, by the time all of the parties are consulted, and it may also promulgate the top-down communications tendencies that have already been noted in the early years of the Service. The placement of the responsible structures and the funding authority within the EEAS (proper) would facilitate more effective "mainstreaming" of key messages that should apply to the horizontal and geographical desks and, beyond that, to the delegations themselves.

In practice, the EEAS's response to the "perfect storm," described above has been mixed. In the shorter term the sovereign debt crisis, or the "eurozone crisis" as it is often known, has undoubtedly thrown up some severe challenges for EU PD. Since the internal market is the core of post-war European integration, any threat to its stability or even existence is bound to have negative knock-on effects for the external aspects of PD.

### **A Crisis for EU Public Diplomacy?**

The policies pursued under German leadership will likely hold the euro together for an indefinite period, but not forever. The permanent division of the European Union into creditor and debtor countries with the creditors dictating terms is politically unacceptable for many Europeans. If and when the euro eventually breaks up it will destroy the common market and the European Union. Europe will be worse off than it was when the effort to unite it began, because the breakup will leave a legacy of mutual mistrust and hostility. The later it happens, the worse the ultimate outcome. That is such a dismal prospect that it is time to consider alternatives that would have been inconceivable until recently.

George Soros, *The Tragedy of the European Union and how to resolve it*. September 27, 2012 in "The New York Review of Books."

It would, nevertheless, be wrong to portray EU PD, or more specifically that of the EEAS, as in crisis. There have been, admittedly rare, opportunities for the Service to promote a positive image of the Union and to reinforce the centrality of norms and principles in the Union's external action. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 to the EU was an open goal in PD terms.<sup>31</sup>

### **At Last, Some Good News . . .**

"I am delighted at the news that the European Union has been awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, in recognition of its work on reconciliation, democracy, promotion of human rights and in enlarging the area of peace and stability across the continent.

In the countries of the EU, historic enemies have become close partners and friends.

I am proud to be part of continuing this work. The creation of the European External Action Service has enabled us to develop a comprehensive approach to better promote Europe's core values throughout the world.

I will continue to work tirelessly to drive this process forward."

Statement by EU High Representative on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union, Brussels, October 12, 2012.

It would also be wrong to leave the reader with the impression that the positive aspects of EEAS PD are circumstance-driven or a matter of serendipity. One particularly striking example of a positive PD drive, based on wider policy initiatives shared across the EU institutions and with a number of international partners, is the "Working with women" initiative. This has multiple facets to it: a broad geographical spread, and is designed to foster awareness of women's issues over a sustained period of time. The tools of PD range from the well conceived website, to conferences in different venues, surveys, and cultural and awareness events built around key days, such as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women or International Women's Day.<sup>32</sup>

There are also examples of coordination challenges stemming from the first year of the EEAS's existence, which coincided with the crisis in Egypt in January 2011. The death of demonstrators in Egypt led to a statement by the High Representative on January 27, 2011, followed by another on January 28. The following day, January 29, 2011, the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, issued a statement on events in Egypt, saying pretty much the same as the statements of the High Representative. The situation was then compounded by

separate statements from Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy, again calling for the avoidance of all violence against unarmed citizens. It could be argued that the same essential message coming from multiple sources strengthens the EU's external actions, but in this case it led to consternation and confusion.

Any coherent external PD must also complement the internal PD efforts conducted through the Commission's DG Communication. Post-Lisbon coordination in this domain falls to the Relex Information Committee's successor, the External Relations Information Committee (ERIC), which carries out the same coordinating role as its predecessor under the aegis of the Strategic Communications Division in the EEAS. The same division produces the daily "Lines To Take" that are distributed to all heads of delegation and press and information officers. These are crucial to the work of delegations, especially if they are provided in a timely manner taking into account time differences with Brussels.

Although the EEAS should be the obvious center of gravity, Trade and Aidco quite clearly indicated their desire for arms-length relations with the EEAS from 2005 onwards. It remains, therefore, an open question as to whether DG Trade and DG Development and Cooperation (as it became on January 3, 2011 through the fusing of DG Development and DG EuropeAid) will take kindly to being coordinated via the EEAS in terms of PD. It could though be legitimately argued that any such coordination functions would follow from the HR/VP's specific responsibilities in her latter role, as well as her treaty-based duty of "coordinating other aspects of Union's external action" (TEU Article 18(4)).

The specific issue of providing PD for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is of particular importance since it is essential to be clear about why and how the EU intends to take action in the crisis management context, especially if the use of military force is involved. Prior to the advent of the Lisbon Treaty PD duties in this realm were spread between the High Representative, the rotating presidency, the Political and Security Committee, the European Commission, the member states (especially in the event of a framework nation operation) and the EU mission commander. At a more general level CSDP-related diplomacy was supported by the Council's Press Service and publications such as the EU Military Staff's *EU Security and Defence News* and the Council Secretariat's web portal with CSDP mission news.

In the post-Lisbon context the appointment of a managing director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination may provide one possible central point for the coordination of these aspects of PD.<sup>33</sup> The issuance of a "Handbook for Spokespersons in CSDP missions and operations" is also intended to harmonize the PD of the various crisis management structures that may be involved in missions or operations, such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EU Military Staff, and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. The PSC, mentioned above, has specific responsibility for drafting the specific tasks when it

comes “master message” that will then underpin the PD for a given CSDP operation.

### **The EU Delegations and Public Diplomacy**

One of the most significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, from a PD perspective, was the advent of EU delegations following the attribution of legal personality to the EU by the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to this, the delegations had only represented those areas of external action represented by the Commission (in other words, not the CFSP aspects). In terms of PD the delegations are designed primarily to communicate the EU’s “values, policies, and results of its projects towards third country stakeholders.”<sup>34</sup> The intermestic nature of the EU’s PD is also evident in the delegations where part of the mandate of the relevant press and information officer in the delegation is to explain EU external actions to the media of the EU members and not only the overseas media.<sup>35</sup>

The strategic elements of the EU’s PD and information efforts in external relations are coordinated through the headquarters while the actual delivery and technical aspects are addressed by 142 delegations and their staff. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty these were delegations of the Commission but they are now delegations of the Union, meaning that they can represent the combined interests of the EU’s external action. The sheer number of delegations is also worth noting, even if many are staffed by only a handful of senior administrators. The EU’s global representation is far larger than the bilateral representation of most of the EU’s members.

The role of the delegations has also been highlighted post-Lisbon with the disappearance of the rotating presidency of the Council in much of EU external relations. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the rotating presidency devoted substantial resources and effort to PD in order to promote the national priorities of the six-month period. Post-Lisbon the external representation of the EU has fallen to the delegations but with little in the way of extra resources and certainly nothing like those available to many of the member states. Cuts in the external relations budget in 2012–13 promise little significant improvement (with little prospect of significant change in the next financial perspective 2014–20).

The centrality of the delegations to post-Lisbon PD can be roughly estimated by the amount of the external relations budget that is earmarked for the delegations (it is though very difficult to ascertain exactly what portion of the expenditure can be attributed to PD since any such expenditure is likely to be spread across several headings). For 2010 the most relevant part of the budget is Title 19, Chapter 19 10, which covers policy strategy and coordination for the EU external relations area. These figures remain ostensibly unchanged for 2011.<sup>36</sup> Approximately €12.5 million was committed for information programmes for nonmember countries and an additional €2 million for “The EU in the World.” The first figure

includes programs run from the headquarters such as the EU visitors programs, publications on external relations, audiovisual material, the development of electronic media, support for the information activities of “opinion leaders,” and visits of journalists. The figure also includes the decentralized activities conducted by the delegations, which include relations with the media, information products, organization of events and cultural activities, newsletters, and information campaigns. The latter figure, although nominally external in nature, is fundamentally about convincing EU citizens that the Union is producing tangible benefits for EU citizens through external policies. By way of comparison, these figures are dwarfed by the €105 million spend on internal communication tools in 2010.<sup>37</sup> Put in rather general terms, most of the funding available for external PD goes to the delegations but this amounts to around 10 percent of the amount spent on information and communication within the EU.

In a notable effort to streamline the EU’s external PD the EEAS (Strategic Communication Division) and DG DEVCO (Communication and Transparency Unit) jointly issued an *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations* in December 2012. The significance of this document lies in the combined provenance of the document but it also reminds the reader that the majority of the administrative staff in the delegations are not EEAS but Commission staff—primarily from DG DEVCO. In it, the delegations are encouraged to concentrate their “messaging and action” around five priority areas, “inspired by the promotion of EU values and based on the delivery of peace, security and prosperity.”<sup>38</sup> They are as follows:

- Promoting the EU as a major partner in democratic transition (in particular in its wider neighborhood);
- Promoting the EU as the world’s biggest cooperation and development donor;
- Promoting the EU as a global economic power responding to the crisis and using trade as an engine for change;
- Promoting human rights through high-level political dialogue with our partners and strategic cooperation programs;
- Promoting the EU as a security provider responding to global security threats.

Several challenges face the delegation staff in achieving these goals. The first and most obvious issue is that there are huge disparities in terms of staffing and capacities between the delegations. All delegations will have a Press and Information officer, but in some delegations this position may only be part of a wider mandate and the training and aptitude for such a role may be limited. Most of them will be locally engaged staff, supervised by the head of the relevant political section. This has the important advantage of allowing the EU top take advantage of local knowledge, languages, and to adapt communications to the local setting.

The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have also had an impact on the delegations due not only to the change in legal personality of the EU but also to the changed role of the rotating presidencies, which has meant an additional burden for the delegations. Among other factors, this now means that the amount of the press information budget that can be allocated to cultural events has increased from 10 to 20 percent.

A second challenge lies with coordinating EU PD with the member states. The delegations have been encouraged to share their PD strategy with the local EU member's representations. Most delegations will hold regular coordination meetings with the local EU member state press and/or cultural counselors. Where appropriate (and where staffing allows) task forces may be created to implement specific projects. Ideally this will lead to joint PD strategies, like those in Brazil or Mexico. At worst, the dangers of ill-coordinated PD result in a counterproductive bifurcation of efforts as in the case of North Africa where there is a "risk of reversion to old habits, whereby Brussels preaches on democracy and human rights, the member states pursue the short-term national interests, the North African countries note and exploit the hypocrisy, the European authority and influence fade."<sup>39</sup>

The third dilemma rests in the question of who the objects of PD are, especially given the diverse human and capital resources represented in the delegations. An increasingly important aspect of the delegation's outreach is dialogue with civil society and this is actively being promoted in particular parts of the world, like the southern Mediterranean. This is though often easier said than done. The small numbers of administrative staff may preclude the kind of extensive engagement with civil society often desired, especially since the Heads of Delegation find their time filled with financial management tasks. There is also the question of what constitutes "civil society," if the basic background to civil society groups is not known, along with their political and financial affiliations, well-intentioned attempts at engagement may be counterproductive. The "message" being communicated also has to resonate with the EU's overall PD, key strategic objectives (where defined), principle and values while, at the same time, it has to be tailored to the specific audience since local considerations, cultural aspects and the history of the EU's relations with the country or region in country will vary widely. An example of this would be the Al-Jisr project where the EU delegation in the Gulf has been supporting the Gulf Research Centre project on PD and outreach with the aim of increasingly mutual awareness and fostering EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relations.

As mentioned, the ability of an individual EU delegation to engage in PD activities varies enormously. An example at the top end of the scale is the delegation in Washington DC where there is a Press and Public Diplomacy (PDD) Section, created in January 2006. The delegation's website states:

The Delegation's Public Diplomacy mission is a key priority because of the strategic importance of the EU/US partnership... To maintain

these fundamental relations and make the partnership even more productive, it is important that we engage with each other on all levels of our societies. It is important that we continue to learn about one another: how our political, economic and social systems function and how we make decisions that advance our common goals.<sup>40</sup>

The section, all told, includes around 18 staff (roughly one-third of which are AD-level or equivalent). The Washington DC delegation was the first to explicitly embrace the term PD in their work, as opposed to the normal emphasis on information and public affairs. The size of this delegation and the presence of a dedicated PD team means that (in EU terms) they are able to offer an unparalleled range of support programs and instruments (but it still compares unfavorably with the larger EU member states representations in Washington DC).<sup>41</sup>

Programs tend to concentrate around outreach programs targeting youth, joint or collaborative events held with the EU member states' embassies and consulates and social media outreach. The *EU Rendez-Vous* program includes senior EU and US leaders discussing challenges of mutual concern for trans-Atlantic relations in the Washington DC area. Nine events were held in 2012 attracting more than 1,100 people.<sup>42</sup> Somewhat predictably Europe Day is a key date in the PD calendar with ambassadors and consuls of the EU member states travelling around the United States to promote awareness about the EU, its policies, and matters of common concern across the Atlantic. In addition, "open houses" (at the member state embassies) are organized around the May 9 celebrations. The open houses in 2012 attracted 23,600 visitors to the 28 venues (including Croatia), with the United Kingdom topping the list.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps more bizarrely, a Eurovision song contest watch party attracted 450 people. Beyond Washington DC, the ten EU Centers of Excellence established at prominent American universities serve as venues for more academic pursuits at the undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as general and local outreach programs.<sup>44</sup> On occasion member state consulates dotted around the United States are also used for outreach activities. The delegation undertook 255 speaking engagements in 2012, of which 40 were in Washington DC. The 2012 budget for all of the individual press and information activities, including those that are project based, amounted to €579,574. If other grant-based instruments are included, just under €1 million should be added, which is rather modest by the standards of the larger and some of the medium-sized member states.

Some of the other larger delegations are also able to offer increasingly sophisticated PD support and services. For instance, the delegation in Moscow has a Press and Information Department; Tokyo has a Press, Public and Cultural Affairs section, while Beijing has a Press and Information Section. These are, however, atypical since the vast majority of the other delegations have to suffice with one-person press, information, and cultural affairs officers. In all cases the EEAS HQ (Strategic

Communications) will provide a “daily flash” with broad lines to take and all delegations are provided with a handbook for PD. The daily flash includes the Commission’s “Lines To Take.” In particular instances, such as the conclusion of a Council meeting, heads of delegation may also be briefed by phone on the main outcomes of the meeting, especially if it pertains directly to their country or region. In specific instances these may be supplemented by engagement with local governments or civil society organizations through electronic and social media (particularly where the latter may be otherwise difficult to engage with).

The inclusion of the CFSP and CSDP elements into the delegation’s PD is a further significant post-Lisbon development with implications for the EU’s PD. This will obviously be of more concern for those delegations located in or proximate to crises or postcrisis countries or areas. In these instances the EU’s PD has to clearly explain the rationale for any CSDP mission, its aims, objectives, and timeframe. In these instances delegation staff will liaise with the relevant authorities for the civilian or military missions in the region that may include a Special Representative who would incur much of the PD burden.

The on the ground challenges involve identifying the relevant interlocutors which may be obvious when it comes to government or official level contacts, but less apparent when it comes to civil society or potential agenda shapers. The question of how to approach PD has often been on a project-based service (following the DG DEVCO model) but this is now changing with the introduction of outsourcing to create a “single visibility campaign.” This model has been followed in Indonesia and Brunei, to internal acclaim, but the obvious risk is that branding and public relations, which are part of PD, may detract from the building up and maintenance of long-term relations that should be at its heart.<sup>45</sup>

Other challenges will also depend upon the locale, but these may include the demographics of the country/region, literacy rates, and Internet penetration. In many instances the Internet and social media are becoming increasingly important and this poses the challenge of being able to communicate effectively using these important new tools (see below). Until recently the maintenance of up-to-date delegation, web-sites was a rather hit or miss affair (often depending upon the inclination and aptitude of the press officer) but this has now been improved with the introduction of a common template and joint management by the headquarters (including the FPI, EEAS, and DEVCO). Press and Information Officers can also access the daily midday press briefing held in Brussels, either by telephone or by video (web-streaming). This, alongside the Lines To Take, represents a significant effort towards communicating a coherent message to external partners (as well as to interested parties within the EU).

The inclusion of the whole gamut of the EU’s external relations interests in the delegations will also require closer coordination with the diplomatic services of the member states so that activities and messages

may be coordinated. The coordination of the PD of the member states with that of the EU is a sensitive issue. It would of course be illusory to hope for a “single voice” since it has long been accepted that diversity is part of the character of the Union. The emphasis is therefore on fostering a “single message,” wherever possible. The regular coordination between the delegations and the EU representations on EU PD strategy and the sharing of “Lines To Take” is designed to encourage the communication of a common EU position. On those cases where there is a clear common interest and position, such as in the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s February 2013 nuclear test, the communication of a coherent message is relatively straightforward.<sup>46</sup> In this and other cases the EU’s PD impact is magnified by the association of the acceding country (Croatia), the candidate countries (the former Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, Iceland, and Serbia), the potential candidate (Albania), the EFTA countries (Lichtenstein and Norway), members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Armenia, who often associate with the declaration. On other occasions the Ukraine has also associated.

It remains to be seen whether temporarily assigned national diplomats serving in the EEAS, who may be in the Service for 4–8 years, will lead to closer PD efforts on the part of the EU and its members. Up to one-third of the administrative staff will be temporarily assigned national diplomats. In mid 2012, 248 diplomats from the member states were serving in the EEAS (out of 920 authorized posts).<sup>47</sup> Thus, while national diplomats did not quite constitute one-third overall (26.9%) they nevertheless represented 37.8 percent of administrative staff in delegations (or 131 posts). Lord Hannay suggested that PD is an area where the national diplomats may be able to make a significant contribution:

The demands of public diplomacy, which are clearly overtaking those of the more classical diplomatic tasks, will require an effective response from the [EEAS] if it is not to find itself playing second fiddle to those national diplomats who are more and more getting to grips with this new dimension.<sup>48</sup>

Most national diplomats will be used to thinking of PD as an integral part of diplomatic practice whereas for the EU official who has served in delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the main emphasis was on management and the effective and legal dispersal of funds. The advantages to the delegation may stem from the willingness of EU members to allow them to tap into existing national networks, especially in the foreign and security policy aspects that were not covered via the delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty. The experience of dealing with diverse groups or individuals may also play to the strengths of national diplomats. The new expanded role of the EU delegations may prove especially attractive to the smaller and newer member states since the EU delegation does not

represent the predominant views of any one member state. In this sense the EU delegations may be seen as carrying less “baggage” than a number of members, especially when former colonial dependencies are involved.

### EU Digital Diplomacy

A growing aspect of diplomacy, as noted above, is “digital diplomacy,” which has obvious applications for PD. The EEAS (as well as DEVCO and TRADE) have recognized the increasing importance of the media and established accounts on social networking and media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr.<sup>49</sup> Senior EU officials, like the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, have established enthusiastic followings on the Chinese Sina Weibo platform. An increasing number of EU delegations are present on social platforms with encouragement from the EEAS (and Commission) to do so. This is a role that the local staff could usefully expand upon since they will be best attuned to which communication strategies are likely to reach the desired target group(s) and, importantly, the local languages or dialects employed. Although this aspect of PD has developed relatively recently, it has now become established within the EEAS with communication on all Service-related issues on a systematic basis. More generally, when the EU is operating in countries with high Internet penetration, the emphasis is increasingly upon electronic information products, rather than paper products. This also implies the need to devote the necessary resources and time to updating and upgrading the relevant EU websites. This is currently not done on a systematic basis and much may depend upon the aptitude of individual staff members, the provision of the necessary skills and training, as well as the time and resources to maintain and update the various websites.

Since the medium should never be confused with the message “e-diplomacy” has its place in PD, but it also has limitations. The challenges with social-media engagement lie with the difficulties in maintaining sustained dialogues on often complex subjects through a medium that naturally condenses and simplifies.

#### Social Media—Convincing?

The EU remains fully committed to a strong and effective multilateral human-rights system that impartially monitors the implementation by all states of their human rights obligations. The EU will vigorously defend the universality of human rights and will continue to speak out against human rights violations worldwide.

EEAS shared link via UN Human Rights Council, February 25, 2013 <https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService>

A closer examination of the EEAS Facebook, Flickr, (where the EEAS maintains a photostream) or Twitter accounts shows evidence of some interactivity (“likes,” retweets, and comments) but this is often not sustained. Many of the comments posted on the EEAS Facebook site elicit no reaction from the EEAS side. Much of the material on the social media sites qualifies as information, with links to official policies or documents. This is largely due to understandable human resource issues, but it also stymies the idea of dialogue and engagement as an integral part of PD. A number of the delegations could also consider greater engagement with local communities through social media and it may also provide useful feedback for the delegation staff. Twitter could be more useful if there were more accurate tools to track, measure, and measure social media results (like hootsuite). Social media may be an important tool in fighting for “rights and liberties” but it should also complement the relevant sectoral dialogues at official level.<sup>50</sup> Finally, there is also the question of cross-platform coordination to make sure that the efforts of the EEAS, DEVCO, and TRADE are communicating the same metamessages (which presumably falls under the aegis of the ERIC group).

Finally, the European Parliament has been particularly active in promoting the role of cultural diplomacy “in advancing the EU’s interests and values in the world” and has also stressed that this should include “digital diplomacy.”<sup>51</sup> The Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education has called for one person in each EU representation overseas to coordinate interaction between the EU and third countries on cultural relations. This aspect of PD has to be treated with sensitivity since member states attach particular linguistic or cultural significance to specific external partners, or they have well-developed forms of outreach such as BBC World Service, Radio France Internationale, Deutsche Welle or Radio Netherlands.

There are some specific fora promoting the cultural dimensions of PD such as the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) with its 2,000 branches in over 150 countries and the Consociato Institutorum Culturalium Europaforum Inter Belgas.<sup>52</sup> Although both are networks with a more general cultural mandate, it is clear that the priorities identified for both organizations, such as EUNIC’s promotion of dialogue with civil society in the Middle East and North Africa, support the more general aims of EU PD and the work of the delegations.

### **Conclusion**

The ability of the EU generally, and the EEAS more specifically, to respond to the relative decline of traditional diplomacy and the rise of PD will depend upon a number of inter-related factors. It is perhaps helpful at this juncture to return to the earlier notions of identity, norms and narratives.

First, effective PD depends upon a clear understanding of *what* is to be communicated. This implies a keener sense of identity or what exactly the EU stands for on the international stage. What is it that is distinct about the international role of the EU? If, as is often argued, the normative approach of the Union is its distinguishing factor, this has to be reflected systematically and the promotion of double standards avoided. The narrative of the EU has to be rewritten at the same time. The “founding myth” of the phoenix rising from the ashes of war is one that has increasingly less resonance with a generation of Europeans whose grandparents may not even remember Second World War, let alone to young Chinese or Indians whose perceptions of the world are changing very rapidly. This is a formidable challenge for PD that demands some fundamental strategic thought and direction if it is to stand any chance of success. In practical terms this implies adopting something akin to the Communication Strategy of 2006 entitled “Europe in the World.” In the absence of such an approach, the only message that risks being communicated to the Union’s external partners is one of confusion, the inability to address internal challenges accompanied by mounting doubts about the model of regional integration that the EU extols externally. This will compromise the legitimacy and authority of the EU’s PD, both internally and externally.

The second consideration is that the EU’s current external PD is highly decentralized with important parts of the EU, like Directorate-General Trade, conducting its own PD. There, are however, encouraging signs of attempts to link the external aspects of the EU’s PD such as those of the EEAS and Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation, facilitated by ERIC. The key element in any centralization is the HR/VP herself. Centralization in practical terms means enhanced coordination between the EEAS, the Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament. This will clearly demand dedicated support within the EEAS to facilitate any such enhanced coordination and will also make it essential that the FPI fosters closer ties and working linkages with the offices for Strategic Planning, Strategic Communications in the EEAS, as well as the relevant Cabinets of the senior external relations actors. The work of ERIC is to be applauded, but it risks being compromised by ongoing resistance to more general political and policy coordination at various levels. In this context coordination between the “triangle” of trade, development and the EEAS (representing the CFSP and CSDP aspects) is of particular importance.

In principle, centralization is therefore desirable and the EEAS should assume a key role in this regard. As has been suggested, centralization should also go beyond the institutional aspects to include the presence of clear, convincing, coherent, and mutually reinforcing messages to communicate externally. In the event that there is no clear strategic view of the EU’s global role, the relevance of centralization may well be reversed. In this scenario a more decentralized model of PD, emphasizing the role of the delegations, may come to the fore. This would be based on country and regional strategy

papers, with the horizontal or thematic ones woven in as appropriate. PD would then become “local.” The danger of this lies in possible inconsistencies, which may become even more apparent due to mass communications. The possible dilution of key aspects, like human rights, would further erode the EU’s identity and weaken its narrative and the legitimacy of any PD.

The danger of this type of inconsistency and weakening may also be promoted by the lack of coordination between the EEAS and the member states. The temptation of the members to offload the more normative agendas on to the EU, while they pursue their more pragmatic interests, should be avoided. The Lisbon Treaty, under Article 24.3 TEU does, after all, oblige the member states to both “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity,” as well as complying with “the Union’s action in this area.” Complementary PD at the European and national levels would be a visible way of demonstrating this treaty commitment.

Finally, the ability to respond to the challenges for PD outlined above will depend upon coordination, notably by the HR/VP, access to the requisite expertise, and the necessary resources. Any serious effort will involve giving PD a more central role within the EEAS proper, linking it to strategic communication and planning and, critically, to the delegations. The influx of national diplomats into the EEAS should be exploited to upgrade the general expertise in PD. More emphasis should be given to effective training for PD as well as for “e” (public) diplomacy. The question of whether this can realistically be done depends in part on the political will of the EU’s leaders and those of the member states to define the EU’s global role more accurately and to thus say something about the type of actor the Union is and should become. It also depends upon human resources, skills, and budgetary support at a time of mounting pressure at the national and EU levels.

### Notes

1. On the origins of this term, see Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,” *International Organization* 42, no.3 (Summer 1999): 427–60.
2. European Commission, *A Glance at EU Public Diplomacy at Work, The EU’s 50th Anniversary Celebrations around the World* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 12.
3. On the EU’s actorness, see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (London: Routledge, 1999), 223–48.
4. Ellen Huijgh, “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension,” *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy – Facets of Diplomacy*, (Fall 2011):63.
5. Draft Communication from Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the Commission, *The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the European Union’s External Policy 2006–9*, C(2006) 329/1, 1(emphasis added).

6. The Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version), The Treaty on European Union, Article 2, in *Official Journal of the European Union* C no. 83/17, (March 30, 2010).
7. See, in particular, Article 3(5) of the Lisbon Treaty.
8. On the use of this term see Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005), 8–9.
9. Numbers provided at the European Commission Protocol Service, List of all missions (updated February, 11 2011), at [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat\\_general/corps/index.cfm?go=search.search&missions=1](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/index.cfm?go=search.search&missions=1).
10. See Press Club Europe, Brussels at <http://www.pressclub.be/>.
11. “Communicating Europe in Partnership,” Speech Margot Wallström, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional relations and communications strategy, ECAS Conference “Is the EU really listening to citizens?,” SPEECH/07/602, October 3, 2007.
12. Jan Melissen, “Beyond the New Public Diplomacy,” Clingendael Paper No.3, October 2011 (Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations), 10.
13. See Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005); Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices,” *Discussions Papers in Diplomacy*, (Den Haag: The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, “Clingendael,” July 2009); Mai’a K. Davis Cross, *EU Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy*, November 2010, at <http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Mai%20Cross%20EU%20PubD%20paper.pdf>.
14. For an overview of the EU-i’s see Video, Oliver Nette, Deputy Head of Unit RELEX.I.5, Information & Communication, European Commission—External Relations Directorate General, Brussels, July, 29 2009, at <http://www.eurunion.org/eu/Content-Items/EU-US-Depository-Librarians-Workshop-July-29-2009-Brussels-Luxembourg-Washington-Video-Downloads.html>.
15. Draft Communication from Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the Commission, *The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the European Union’s External Policy 2006–9*, C(2006) 329/1, Section 4.
16. M. Bruter, “Diplomacy Without a State: The External Delegations of the European Commission,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 2 (1999): 199–200.
17. *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012 Brussels, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 3.
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19. The European External Action Service: A step change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty, (undated) available at [http://www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit\\_en/267601-en.pdf](http://www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit_en/267601-en.pdf)
20. Quoted in Paul Sturm, “Shoring up the EU’s public diplomacy in CSDP, in *European Security Review* no. 52, ISIS Europe (November 2010):.4.
21. Address by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, to the College of Europe, *The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World*, PCE 34/10, Bruges, February, 25 2010, 3 and 2, respectively.
22. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints the Permanent Chair of the Political and Security Committee Policy, Brussels, A 231/10, November 16, 2010.
23. Figures from David Spence, Evidence given to the European Union Sub-Committee for External Affairs, House of Lords, on the European External Action Service,

- December 12, 2012, 48, available at <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/EEAS/WrittenevidencevolumeEEASv1.pdf>.
24. Proposal from The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council, *Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*, March 25, 2010, 8029/10, 7 and 17 (and Annex “Basic Structures”).
  25. *Ibid.*, 17.
  26. The July 2010 Council decision lists in an annex those department and functions to be transferred to the EEAS which, in numerical terms means that for AD posts 585 will be transferred from the Commission (DG Relex), 93 from DG Development, and 436 posts transferred from DG Relex’s External Service (i.e., the delegations). In addition 411 were transferred from the Council Secretariat. 118 new posts will be created in the period 2011–2013 at AD level. The total is number of positions created in the EEAS at AD level is therefore 1,643. Moreover, the Council decision states that “at least one third of the all EEAS staff at AD level” shall comprise staff from the Member States (and that permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60 percent of all EEAS staff at AD level). This implies that around 350 temporary agent posts will have to be filled by diplomats.
  27. Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service, July 26, 2010 (2010/427/EU), *Official Journal of the European Union* L 201/30, 3 August 2010, Article 4, 9 (6) and Annex.
  28. See [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf).
  29. European Commission, Framework Service Contract Number FPIS 2011–01, March 2010.
  30. Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service, 26 July 2010 (2010/427/EU), *Official Journal of the European Union* L 201/30, August 3, 2010, Article 9(6) and Annex.
  31. For a full statement of the decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee see [http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en\\_GB/laureates/laureates-2012/announce-2012/](http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2012/announce-2012/).
  32. See [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/special-features/features\\_working\\_women\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/special-features/features_working_women_en.htm).
  33. EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response Brussels, A 244/10, December 2, 2010.
  34. *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012 Brussels, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 3.
  35. See [http://eeas.europa.eu/eucom/news/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/eucom/news/index_en.htm).
  36. Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2011, Volume 3, Section III, Commission, p.III-792 available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB\\_2011/EN/SEC03.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB_2011/EN/SEC03.pdf).
  37. The three areas include Communication and the Media, Going Local Communication and Analysis and communication tools. It does not include the €112 spent on administrative support for DG Communication. See General Budget 2010, Volume 4, Section 3 (Commission), Title 16 available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010\\_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN17942/index.html](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN17942/index.html).
  38. *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 4.
  39. Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin, *A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations*, (European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2012), 5.
  40. See <http://www.eurunion.org/delegati/ppd/ppd.htm>.

41. For an overview see “Engaging the World: The EU’s Public Diplomacy,” *EU Insight*, no. 42, July 2010 (Washington DC: Delegation of the European Union to the United States).
42. Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.
43. Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.
44. The grant of €3.1 million covers nine universities as well as a consortium of Washington DC area universities. For full details see <http://www.euintheus.org/what-you-can-do/apply-for-a-grant/eu-centers-of-excellence/current-grantees-eu-centers-of-excellence/>. EU Centers have also been established in Australia (3), Canada (3), Japan (4), New Zealand (1), and Russia (6).
45. See *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 20.
46. See *Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2013/88/CFSP amending Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, 7302/13, Brussels, March 8, 2013 and; *Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on nuclear threats and human rights in North Korea*, A133/13, Strasbourg, March 13, 2013.
47. Staffing in the European External Action Service, (Brussels: EEAS), June 1, 2012, 3.
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49. See <https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService>; [https://twitter.com/eu\\_eas](https://twitter.com/eu_eas); <http://www.flickr.com/photos/eeas/>.
50. *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, January 11, 2013, 12.
51. Marietje Schaake (rapporteur), *Draft Report on the cultural dimensions of the EU’s external action*, Committee on Culture and Education (2010/2161), November 29, 2010, 5.
52. For details of EUNIC please see <http://www.eunic-online.eu/>. The CICEIB currently represents Alliance Française, the British Council, the Cervantes Institute, the Danish cultural Institute, the Finnish cultural institute, the Goethe-Institut, the Italian cultural institute, the Louvain Institute, the Austrian Cultural Forum, and the Czech Cultural Center.